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E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION
TAGS: [PREL](#) [UNSC](#) [KUNR](#)
SUBJECT: UNSC EXPANSION: DEBATE REVIVED IN THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, G-4 SEEKS NEGOTIATIONS

REF: STATE 59528

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Permanent
Representative, for reasons 1.4 b,d.

[¶1.](#) (C) Summary and Comment. The debate on Security Council expansion has flashed hot again in New York, in the wake of the report of the most recent set of facilitators to tackle this long-running issue. Disappointed with the content of the report, the G-4 countries are seeking new facilitators with a mandate to move the membership towards a negotiation on the "elements" of a resolution. Their opponents are strongly opposed to a new facilitators process and any discussion of options that go beyond those contained in the most recent report. The decision on how to proceed now (uneasily) rests with GA President Khalifa, who had sought to avoid this very predicament from the start. Whatever she chooses, she is likely to upset a number of influential PRs in New York.

[¶2.](#) (C) There is a very real chance of a return to the contentious debates of the summer of 2005. The lip service paid to "flexibility" by the key protagonists over the past year has quickly evaporated, now that specific alternatives are being discussed. The G-4 cannot accept a process that would appear to eliminate the possibility of new permanent seats. At the same time, their opponents feel threatened by a process that could lead to another vote getting exercise, particularly in Africa. End Summary and Comment.

Security Council Expansion Debate:
Back to the Future

[¶3.](#) (C) General Assembly (GA) President Khalifa faces a difficult and contentious decision on the way forward on Security Council expansion. The sharp, negative exchanges that characterized the debate on expansion in 2005, but had been largely absent over the past year, re-emerged during the GA's May 3 - 4 debates. These meetings of the "Open Ended Working Group" on Council reform were organized by Khalifa to respond to her facilitators' report released in April and to establish a GA process on Council Reform for the rest of the 61st Session. Ambassador Khalilzad delivered the U.S. statement, reaffirming U.S. support for expansion and for Japan's permanent membership, while noting the importance of comprehensive reform of the entire UN organization. His statement is available via the USUN website (www.un.int/usa).

¶4. (C) The G-4 (India, Brazil, Japan and Germany) used the debate to call on Khalifa to appoint one or two new facilitators to draft an "options paper" on Council expansion by the middle of June. This paper would lay out specific options for Council expansion, including: expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members (the G-4 approach); interim expansion in a new, semi-permanent category (as advocated by the facilitators); or expansion of non-permanent members only. Publicly, the G-4 is calling for the creation of such an elements paper as a means to kick start the process of negotiation on a text. They admit privately, though, that their first priority is to get such a paper prior to this summer's African Union Summit and try to break the current African common position, which is widely understood to be preventing a number of potential supporters from joining the G-4.

¶5. (C) The Uniting for Consensus (UFC) group of G-4 opponents (led by Pakistan, Italy and Korea) objects to the call for new facilitators. UFC delegations accuse the G-4 of trying "to switch horses mid-stream" after getting a facilitators' report that concluded that new permanent seats were probably not achievable at this time. UFC delegations have asked Khalifa to continue consultations on the basis of the facilitators' report. Pakistani PR Munir Akram said, "Either accept the report as the basis for future work or do not -- you cannot have it both ways." UFC is worried that the G-4 will capitalize on the "new momentum" created by the facilitators' report and the process established by the GA President, without being forced to accept the idea that new permanent seats are not viable at this time.

A New G-4 Plan?

¶5. (C/NF) At the same time, there are rumors in New York that the G-4 has developed a new plan for Council expansion. An Italian colleague told USUN that the plan would include five new permanent seats (two elected from the entire membership, and one each reserved for Africa, Asia and Latin America) and four new non-permanent seats (one each for Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia). Among the rumors is some confusion about exactly which G-4 countries are said to be in favor of this approach, and whether or not all of the details of the proposal, including potential recall clauses, have been agreed. (Note: In our bilateral discussions, G-4 delegations have offered USUN no indication that Q a proposal is in the works.)

¶6. (C) During the GA debate, Pakistan's Akram left no doubt that UFC delegations would respond negatively to the G-4's introduction of such a proposal: "There should be no pre-emptive moves or arbitrary presentations by anyone. Such moves would destroy the process and undermine momentum, with theQuences we all witnessed in 2005."

Why does the G-4 want new facilitators?

¶7. (C) Conventional wisdom in New York is that the air had come out of the Security Council expansion balloon over the past year. A German contact told USUN that delegations that had co-sponsored the G-4 resolution in 2005 had lost their enthusiasm for the expansion debate. The Germans blame this diminishing support on the lack of cohesion among the G-4 (which they primarily attribute to Japanese courtship of U.S. support). Others attribute it to a general sense of fatigue after more than a decade of debates on this topic with little sense that compromise was near.

¶8. (C) The G-4 seek to capitalize on the sense of "new momentum" established by the facilitators' report to re-energize their base. However, they remain opposed to the substance of the report, in particular its suggestion that the best way forward is an interim solution that does not include new permanent seats. The G-4 needs to turn the GA process into one that allows for the re-introduction of their basic position. Consultations on the basis of the current report are unlikely to give them this window, and they appear

unwilling to introduce a revised proposal on their own as a stand-alone document, understanding that it will receive a lukewarm reception and could be attacked as an effort to undermine the President's process.

¶9. (C) At the same time, the G-4 continues to see African support as the key to achieving the two-thirds majority in the GA required for passage. India, in particular, has been aggressively courting African support for expansion in both categories through a "South Initiative". (Note: Though our knowledge of this initiative is incomplete, we understand that they have hosted a series of meetings of developing countries to develop proposals on reform initiatives like Council expansion and GA revitalization.)

¶10. (C) The G-4 would like the Africans to be presented with a series of options on expansion prior to their Summit this summer. Their proposal for a new facilitators' process is designed to narrow the choices on paper (presumably eliminating as unrealistic the African position of two permanent seats with a veto), leaving the Africans with the choice between a smaller, interim expansion and a modified G-4 proposal. The G-4 believe that, given such a choice, at least some Africans would choose the G-4 model, breaking the African consensus position and opening the door to a vote-getting push on the continent. (Comment: The G-4 has been confounded by African decision-making in the past, and it is not clear to us that their scenario will play out as expected, even if the President appoints facilitators with the mandate they seek.)

And the P-5?

¶11. (C) China and Russia are concerned that the G-4 may have found a way to capitalize on the report and advance their aggressive Council expansion proposal. Though they both seek to avoid the spotlight on this issue, the Chinese explicitly called on the GA President, during the GA debate, not to appoint new facilitators. China's DPR said that it was too

soon to begin a negotiation, given the wide disparity of views among the membership and the sensitive national interests at stake. The Chinese have told us that they plan to call on Khalifa at the Ambassadorial-level to reinforce the point.

¶12. (C/NF) The UK and France reiterated their support of the individual G-4 candidate countries. France, a G-4 co-sponsor in 2005, expressed support for negotiations, but noted that "none of the previous resolutions have the necessary support", a comment that was not welcomed by the G-4. The UK never actually co-sponsored the G-4 resolution, though they were publicly supportive of the proposal. Privately, UKUN officers have been more skeptical about the benefits of expansion than their national statements. They remain concerned about any discussion that calls attention to the "special status" of permanent members.

The Facilitators' Interim Solution

¶13. (C) The five facilitators drafted their report (emailed to IO in April) based on more than two months of consultations with a broad range of delegations. Their report demonstrates a strong bias towards an "interim" or "transitional" approach to enlarging the Council, which would result in a moderate expansion of seats in a new, "semi-permanent" category. However, they did not lay out any of the details of a specific proposal for expansion on an interim basis, or what sort of review mechanism is anticipated, leaving these issues "for negotiations."

¶14. (C) The facilitators' approach, which includes a call for the "widest possible political acceptance" of any proposed expansion model, beyond the legally required minimums established by the Charter, is based on an understanding among them (Dutch PR Majoor in particular) that the debate along established G-4/UFC lines was going nowhere.

¶15. (U) The facilitators' report is available at www.un.org/ga/president/61/letters/SC-reform-Facil-report-20-April-07.pdf
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